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Very limited empirical studies exist on the impact of remittances on poverty in Africa. To fill 
this gap in the literature, this study analyses the impact of remittances on poverty in a panel of 
32 African countries. The study expands upon earlier work by including two additional foreign 
currency inflows, exports and Official Development Assistance (ODA). Accounting for 
possible heteroscedasticity and endogeneity, the results consistently show that remittances 
significantly reduce poverty. Exports and ODA are found to have a statistically insignificant 
effect on poverty. The absence of a significant relationship between exports, ODA and poverty 
suggest that the growth gains from exports and ODA fail to trickle down to the poor. These 
results highlight the significance of remittances as a source of finance for development.  
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While neither migration nor cross-border remittances are a recent occurrence, the latter have 
become a topic of increasing interest in development economics over recent years. Cross-
border remittances are the sum of two components in the balance of payments, personal 
transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of current transfers 
between resident and non-resident households. While compensation of employees refers to the 
income of short-term seasonal workers employed in economies where they are non-residents, 
and the income of residents employed by non-resident entities (World Bank, 2015b). The 
upward trend of cross-border remittances to developing countries has led to a resurgence of 
focus on remittances. Studies analysing the impact of cross-border remittances have 
predominantly focused on developing regions in East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and South Asia. Very limited empirical 
studies, however, exist on the developmental impact of cross-border remittances to Africa; 
most empirical studies examine the impact of remittances at the household and community 
level. This study seeks to fill the gap in the literature by analysing the impact of cross-border 
remittances on poverty in Africa.  
Remittances to Africa have increased substantially over the years, rising from US$11.45 billion 
in 2000 to US$50.11 billion in 2010 (World Bank, 2015a). They are an important source of 
foreign finance, accounting for over 15% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in countries such 
as Lesotho, Liberia, Gambia and Comoros. They are the largest source of external financial 
flows to Africa, exceeding both Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and aid flows since 2010.  
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There are two distinguishing features of remittances. First, they are more stable relative to other 
foreign financial flows (Gupta, Pattillo & Wagh, 2009:105).  Second, they tend to behave 
counter-cyclically. Quarterly and Blankson (2004) found that remittances to Ghana move 
counter-cyclically with respect to the economic cycle and are beneficial in smoothing 
household income and consumption over time. The counter-cyclical nature of remittances 
enables them to absorb external shocks that could negatively affect the economies of recipient 
countries.  
Given the stable and counter-cyclical nature of remittances, it has become increasingly 
important to analyse their effects on development. Evidence from around the globe suggests 
that remittance-receiving households generally have higher levels of income and lower 
incidences of extreme poverty compared to households that do not receive remittances 
(Kamuleta, 2014:18). Ratha (2013) argues that remittances can play a pivotal role in 
contributing towards poverty reduction, as they tend to increase the incomes of recipient 
households.  
A number of studies have analysed the relationship between remittances and poverty. Using a 
sample of 1000 households from three villages across rural Egypt, Adams (1991) found that 
the number of poor households decreases by 9.8% when international remittances are included 
in household income. Similarly, Yang and Martinez (2006) analysed the impact of remittances 
on poverty using household surveys in the Philippines and found remittances to have a negative 
relationship with poverty.  
Despite the growing importance of remittances as a source of finance for development, the high 
cost of sending remittances to and within Africa limit their impact on development outcomes 
in Africa. In 2013, the average cost of sending remittances to and within Africa was 11.5%; 
this compared with a global average of 8.9% (World Bank, 2013). A report by the Overseas 
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Development Institute (ODI) estimated a mid-range annual loss of $1.8 billion as a result of 
Africa’s high remittance costs (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:20). At current levels of per-pupil 
spending, $1.8 billion would be sufficient to put roughly 14 million African children into 
school (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:21). Moreover, the savings that would result from reducing 
the high remittance costs would be enough to provide clean water to 21 million people or 
improved sanitation to 8 million people (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:21).  These estimates 
illustrate the magnitude of the opportunity cost associated with Africa’s high remittance costs. 
The G7 and the G20 have taken a number of steps to reduce the cost of sending remittances. In 
2008, the G7 adopted a quantitative goal towards halving the global cost of sending remittances 
from 10% to 5% over five years (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:17). Although this commitment has 
been reaffirmed and taken up in a number of countries, the commitment has had no discernible 
effect on Africa’s high remittance costs.  
A number of factors contribute to maintain Africa’s high remittance cost structure. Exclusivity 
agreements involving major Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) and commercial banks are one 
of the drivers of Africa’s high remittance costs as they restrict competition. These agreements 
allow MTOs to carry out transactions through designated commercial banks (Ratha, 
Mohapatra, & Scheja, 2011), and have the effect of increasing the cost of market entry, 
reducing competition, and creating highly segmented markets characterised by limited 
competition.  
Reducing remittance costs in Africa and increasing competitiveness in the market for 
remittances will maximise the flow of remittances directly to the hands of recipients. Moreover, 
formalising remittance transaction services will help reduce the cost of sending remittances 
and will leverage remittances for development purposes (Kamuleta, 2014: 50).  
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1.1 Statement of the Problem 
There is a growing body of literature evaluating the developmental effects of remittances to 
Africa. Existing studies have predominantly focused on the impact of remittances on poverty 
for specific villages or countries in Africa, for example, Adams (1991) utilized household 
survey data from three villages in rural Egypt and Adams and Cuecuecha (2013) utilised a 
dataset consisting of Ghanaian households to investigate the effects of remittances on poverty. 
Very limited empirical studies, however, exist on the impact of remittances on poverty in 
Africa at the aggregate level.  This study seeks to fill the gap in the literature by evaluating the 
relationship between remittances and poverty in a broad panel of African countries.  
In evaluating the relationship between remittances and poverty, we build on the basic growth-
poverty model suggested by Ravillion and Chen (1997). Aside from remittances, other foreign 
currency inflows may have an impact on poverty; therefore we expand upon previous work by 
incorporating exports and Official Development Assistance (ODA). By including two 
additional foreign currency inflows i.e. exports and ODA, we test for the significance of 
remittances on poverty relative to other foreign currency flows.  
We first use a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model to estimate the poverty-elasticity 
of remittances. Next we consider the possible violations of the Gauss-Markov assumptions and 
use appropriate estimation techniques to tackle these issues.  
1.2 Contribution of the study 
The study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, by looking specifically at 
Africa, it provides a richer analysis of the impact of remittances on poverty in the continent 
than that provided by studies with global coverage. Second, it develops the most commonly 
used data set on remittances, poverty and inequality by expanding the data coverage of African 
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countries. Lastly, by incorporating exports and ODA, the study seeks to determine the 
importance of remittances on poverty relative to other foreign currency inflows.  
1.3 Limitations of the study 
The availability of poverty and remittances data was the main limitation of the study. Poverty 
data are based on household surveys that take place once every few years. Moreover, a number 
of African countries generally do not record or publish data on remittances. For those reasons, 
the analysis could only include countries that have at least two observations.  
1.4 Organisation of the study 
The study is organised as follows: Chapter two Section one provides a detailed summary of the 
recent trends in remittances to Africa, while Section two provides a summary of the definition 
and measures of poverty. Chapter three reviews the literature on remittances. Chapter four 
outlines the research methodology and data. Chapter five discusses the empirical results and, 




Remittances to Africa 
2.1.1 Recent trends in remittances to Africa 
Remittances to developing countries have grown rapidly over recent years, rising from roughly 
US$292 billion in 2010 to US$436 billion in 2014 (World Bank, 2015b). Africa has been part 
of the global surge in remittance flows. Remittances to the continent have increased 
substantially, rising from US$11.6 billion in 2000 to US$50.1 billion in 2010. The 331.9% 
growth in remittances to Africa over the period 2000-10 (from US$11.6 billion to US$50.1 
billion) illustrates how growth in remittances has accelerated. Remittances continue to be the 
largest source of external financial flows to Africa, exceeding both FDI and aid flows since 
2010. Figure 1 illustrates financial inflows to Africa (in billions of US dollars) over the period 
1983 to 2013 (World Bank, 2015a). 
Figure 1. Financial inflows to Africa, 1983-2013 (billions of US dollars) 









































































Remittances are an important source of finance for African countries. Lesotho, Gambia, 
Liberia, Comoros and Senegal, for example, receive about 20% of GDP in the form of 
remittances (see Table 1). Although remittances account for a comparatively smaller share of 
GDP in larger countries, they still make up a larger share of GDP compared to other sources 
of external financial flows. In 2013, for example, remittances to Egypt were 6.6% of GDP, 
while ODA and FDI flows were 2% and 1.5% of GDP respectively.  
Table 1. Remittance flows to African countries (% of GDP), 2013 






Cabo Verde 9.6 
Togo 9.2 








Source: World Bank (2015b) 
Remittances tend to be more stable relative to other external financial flows. Over the period 
1983-2012, remittances to Africa were not only less volatile than ODA but they were also less 
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volatile than FDI, which is often perceived as the most stable external financial flow (see Figure 
2 below) (Gupta, Patillo and Wagh, 2009:105). Remittances also tend to behave counter-
cyclically.  They tend to increase in response to external shocks in recipient countries and 
decrease when conditions are more favourable.  
Figure 2. Volatility of external flows to Africa1 
Source: Author’s calculations. Data is from World Bank (2015a). 
2.1.2 Market for remittances in Africa 
Remittance service providers (RSPs) in Africa offer services to clients and charge fees either 
directly or through agents working for RPSs. Recipients receive remittances through MTOs, 
commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions such as micro-finance institutions, or post 
offices. The functions of the key service providers are summarised briefly below. 













2.1.2.1 Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) 
Money Transfer Operators provide electronic money transfer services and cash-to-cash 
transfers. They work through networks of agents as well as in partnerships with commercial 
banks in recipient countries. Remittance markets in Africa are dominated by a duopoly of 
MoneyGram and Western Union, the two largest MTOs. MoneyGram and Western Union 
together account for over half of the total market share in 22 countries in Africa (Watkins & 
Quattri, 2014:17). 
2.1.2.2 Commercial banks 
Commercial banks are the only RSPs authorised to carry out transfer services in most African 
countries and typically pair up with large MTOs, such as MoneyGram and Western Union. 
Commercial banks account for over half of the in-bound remittance payments in 29 countries 
across Africa (Watkins & Quattri, 2015:18).  
2.1.2.3 Non-bank financial institutions 
Non-bank financial institutions include micro-finance institutions (MFIs) and credit unions. 
Under the regulations operating in most African countries, only a few are authorised to pay 
remittances directly (Watkins & Quattri, 2015:18). Generally, these institutions only function 
as payment agents for MTOs.  
2.1.2.4 Post Offices 
In comparison to commercial banks, post offices in Africa have higher levels of coverage, 
particularly in rural areas. This provides them with the opportunity to tap into the market for 
remittances.  
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2.1.2.5 Innovative RSPs 
The use of new communication and information technology is becoming increasingly common 
in the market for remittances (Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development 
[OECD], 2010). A number of innovative transfer technologies have been developed to expand 
access to electronic transfer services. The most significant of these are mobile banking transfer 
services accessible through partnerships between mobile phone companies and commercial 
banks (Kamuleta, 2014:30). Vodafone-Safaricom, for example, launched mobile banking 
services in Kenya, M-PESA, to facilitate mobile transactions.  With over 7 million customers, 
M-PESA has generated over US$ 88.5 million worth of daily transactions (UNCTAD, 2013).
M-PESA is a cheap, fast and convenient way of making transactions and allows customers to
transfer money to any mobile network at any time (Kamuleta, 2014:31). 
The example of M-PESA indicates that there is a growing market for innovative transaction 
technologies that facilitate the geographical reach of RSPs, particularly in rural areas with 
limited coverage (Mohapatra & Ratha, 2011). New transaction technologies, such as M-PESA, 
have increased the accessibility and affordability of remittances, thus increasing inclusion in 
financial services, particularly for recipients who lack access to formal financial services 
(OECD, 2010).  
2.1.3 Remittance channels in Africa 
Migrants use formal and informal channels for remitting money. 
2.1.3.1 Formal channels 
The main formal RSPs are MTOs, commercial banks, post offices, mobile network operators 
(MNOs), as well as other non-bank financial institutions such as MFIs. Formal channels are of 
particular importance as they can facilitate formal financial inclusion by expanding access to 
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other financial services and products in both the sending and recipient country (Gupta, Patillo 
& Wagh, 2009; Agunias & Newland, 2012). Generally, commercial banks, MTOs and post 
offices are assumed to provide the highest levels of reliability, security and a larger 
geographical reach through their local branches.  
2.1.3.2 Informal channels 
Sending or receiving remittances through informal channels is the most common method 
available for people living in areas with limited access to formal financial services. Informal 
channels involve the use of relatives, friends or couriers to send remittances. Hawala is one of 
the most prevalent money transfer systems used in the informal remittance market. The basic 
hawala mechanism works as follows: “the remitter pays, often with a small fee, the first transfer 
person (in the sending country), who informs the second transfer person (in the recipient 
country), and the second transfer person releases funds to the recipient” (Kamuleta, 2014:34). 
There are contrasting views regarding the use of informal remittance channels. A number of 
authors find that their fragmented nature provides advantages as they make services accessible 
to people living in areas with limited access to formal financial services (Hariharan, 2012; 
Rodima-Taylor et al., 2013). While others have taken on a less positive view, perceiving them 
as a means for criminal activity (Looney, 2003). According to Maimbo and Passas (2005), 
sending remittances through informal channels increases the likelihood of capital flight, tax 
evasion and smuggling.  
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2.1.3.3 User Preferences 
A migrant’s choice of remittance channel and RSP may be influenced by a number of factors 
such as cost, accessibility, speed and service.  Table 2 summarises the advantages and 
disadvantages of each.  
Table 2.Advantages and Disadvantages of Remittance Channels and RSPs
Remittance 
Channel 
RSP Advantages Disadvantages Accessibility Cost 
Formal 
MTOs Very accessible in 
urban areas; fast; 
and reliable 
Less accessible in rural 
areas; and high cost per 
transaction, particularly 




Very accessible in 
most sending 
countries; reliable; 
and often the 
cheapest option for 
large transactions 
Less accessible in 
receiving countries, 
particularly in locations 
with weak financial 
sectors; sender and 
receiver must maintain 
accounts in order to make 
transactions; high cost per 
transaction; and service 




Post offices Very accessible in 
both sending and 
receiving countries; 
and often cheaper 
than other formal 
RSPs 
Can be unreliable; slow; 
and possible delays at 
receiving end because of 
lack of liquidity and poor 




Hawala Operate in locations 
with limited access 
to formal financial 
services; costs are 
generally lower than 
formal RSPs; fast; 
reliable; and door-
to-door delivery 
In some cases, costs may 







Operate in locations 
with limited or no 
access to formal 
financial services; 
no direct costs; and 
reliable  
Slow; and the risk of loss 
of funds  
High Low 
Source: Adapted from Sander and Maimbo (2003). 
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Informal channels are generally used wherever the formal financial sector is weak and 
unreliable, with high transaction costs (Sander & Maimbo, 2003:27). The use of formal 
channels increases in economies with strong and reliable financial sectors.   
The inefficiencies of weak and unreliable commercial banks in Africa has left a gap in the 
market for remittances and has paved the way for formal MTOs. In comparison to banks, MTOs 
cover a broader network of locations. 
Although post offices also offer broader coverage, particularly in rural areas, they are generally 
not used as RSPs because of their poor service and inefficiency. Even in countries where post 
offices operate effectively, not all are authorised to handle transfers because of the costs and 
risks involved (Sanders & Maimbo, 2003; Cross, 2003).  
Altogether, a number of factors can influence a migrant’s choice of remittance channel. 
External factors such as exchange rate fluctuations and foreign exchange controls in a migrant’s 
home country can also influence a migrant’s choice of remittance channel; as well as other 
factors such as accessibility and cost. Accessibility is an important factor to consider. Although 
bigger cities provide fairly good access to financial services, rural areas typically do not receive 
as much coverage. Many remitters, however, need to make transfers to locations with weak 
financial infrastructure in which commercial banks have little or no coverage. In such cases, 
recipients can only receive remittances through informal channels (Watkins & Quattri, 2014).  
2.1.4 The cost of remittances to Africa 
The World Bank’s Send Money Africa Remittance Cost database has made it possible to 
compare the cost of sending remittances from selected countries, worldwide, to a number of 
African countries. In 2013, the average cost of sending money to and within Africa was 11.5%; 
while the average global cost was 8.9% (World Bank, 2013). With an average cost of 11.5%, 
sending US$200 to and within Africa was 2.6% higher than the global average. The most 
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expensive sending markets in Africa were Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa, which measured 
26%, 20.2% and 19.3% respectively.  
A number of factors contribute to maintain Africa’s high remittance cost structure, these 
include: “limited competition, regulatory practices that limit market entry, and a lack of 
financial inclusion” (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:25). 
Exclusivity agreements between big MTOs and banks are one of the drivers of Africa’s high 
remittance costs as they restrict competition (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:24). Exclusivity 
agreements with commercial banks allow MTOs to carry out transactions through designated 
commercial banks (Ratha, Mohapatra, & Scheja, 2011). A 2007 survey carried out in Nigeria 
found that 84% of commercial banks in the country have exclusivity agreements with either 
MoneyGram or Western Union (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:17). This virtual duopoly operated 
by MoneyGram and Western Union is stifling competition in the market for remittances in 
Africa.  
The G7 and the G20 have taken a number of steps to reduce high remittance costs in developing 
countries. In 2008, the G7 adopted a quantitative goal towards halving the global cost of 
remittances, from 10% to 5% over five years (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:17). Although this 
commitment has been reaffirmed and taken up in a number of countries, the commitment has 
had no discernible effect on reducing remittance costs in African countries.  
Reducing remittance costs in Africa and increasing transparency and competitiveness in the 
market for remittances will maximise the flow of remittances directly to the hands of recipients. 
Moreover, formalising remittance transaction services will help reduce the cost of sending 
remittances and will leverage remittances for development purposes (Kamuleta, 2014:50).  
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Section Two 
Defining and Measuring Poverty 
2.2.1 Defining Poverty 
The study uses poverty to analyse the developmental impact of remittances in Africa. As a 
multidimensional phenomenon, poverty can be defined and measured in different ways. The 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) defines poverty as a human 
condition characterised by the sustained deprivation of resources, choices, capabilities, security 
and power necessary for adequate standard of living (UNHCR, 2004). Thus, poverty can be 
described as the state of being without the necessities of daily living, often associated with 
hardship, need and lack of resources across a wide range of circumstances. Economic 
deprivation is a standard feature of most definitions of poverty.  
Development agencies often employ quantitative measures of poverty, such as those setting a 
threshold of one or two dollars a day. Poverty can also be measured by specific indicators 
relating to certain economic and social factors, such as infant mortality and literacy rates. 
Although quantitative poverty measures may fail to account for several aspects of poverty, they 
provide a number of benefits including (Chamber, 2002:22): 
 the comparison of time series to identify trends;
 the cross-sectional comparison of different households, communities, countries and
regions;
 the estimation of distributions within populations and regions; as well as
 the credibility of numbers in influencing policy-makers.
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As far as the poverty issue is discussed, it is always closely associated with the poverty line. 
The poverty line is the minimum threshold level of income, or consumption, below which one 
cannot afford to purchase all the resources one requires to live. Practically, different countries 
often use different poverty lines. However, in general, it is more common to use one poverty 
line in order to compare economic welfare levels across countries and regions. When 
comparing poverty across countries, the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate is used. 
PPP exchange rates are used to ensure that poverty levels do not change with normal exchange 
rates (Makoka & Kaplan, 2005:6).  
2.2.2 Poverty Measures 
There are several methods that can be used to measure poverty2, this study makes use of the 
poverty headcount and the poverty gap indices.  
2.2.2.1 Poverty Headcount, 𝑷𝟎
The Poverty Headcount Index, denoted as 𝑃0, measures the share of the population whose 
consumption, or income, is below the poverty line. This poverty measure quantifies the share 
of the population that cannot afford to buy a basket of goods.  














N = total population 
I(.) = an indicator function taking a value of 1 (below the poverty line) if the bracketed 
expression is true, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑦𝑖 = welfare indicator, e.g. consumption per capita 
2 These methods include the Poverty Headcount Index, the Poverty Gap Index, the Squared Poverty Gap Index 
and the Human Poverty Index.   
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z = poverty line 
𝑁𝑝 = number of poor individuals in the population 
The Poverty Headcount measure has the advantage of being easy to construct and understand. 
It also has the advantage of being an adequate measure of assessing the overall progress in 
reducing poverty. However, it does suffer from a number of limitations (Makoka & Kaplan, 
2005:19). First, it does not account for differences in well-being between different households 
living below the poverty line. And second, it does not take the depth of poverty into account. 
For this reason, the Poverty Gap Index is also employed.  
2.2.2.2 Poverty Gap, 𝑷𝟏
The Poverty Gap Index, 𝑃1, measures the degree to which the mean income of the poor differs 
from the established poverty line. It is also called the Depth of Poverty Index.  
















where the variables are defined as in equation 1. 
The advantage of the poverty gap measure is that it reflects the average shortfall of poor 
individuals, thereby giving a better understanding of the depth of poverty (Makoka & Kaplan, 
2005:19). Another advantage of this measure is that it gives an indication of how much would 
have to be transferred to the poor to bring their expenditure up to the poverty line. It is therefore 
easy to derive, from the index, the minimum cost of eliminating poverty with transfers i.e. the 
cost of eliminating poverty by targeting the poor directly. However, the limitations of the 
poverty gap index are that it does not capture differences in the severity of poverty among the 




This chapter summarises the literature on remittances. Section one focuses on the motives and 
determinants of remittances. Section two focuses on the impact of remittances at the household 
and national level. Finally, section three looks at the relationship between remittances, 
inequality and poverty.  
3.1 Motives and determinants of remittances 
3.1.1 Micro level 
The literature concerning the motives for remitting has been influenced to a large extent by 
Lucas and Stark’s (1985) paper, Motivations to remit: Evidence from Botswana. In their paper, 
household data from Botswana is used to analyse remittances from household members 
working in other parts of the country (Lucas & Stark, 1985). They postulate key motives for 
remitting money as: pure altruism; pure self-interest; and other intermediate motives (Carling, 
2008:584). 
Migrants are considered to be altruistic if their utility is derived from their family’s utility, 
which is assumed to depend on their family’s consumption (Carling, 2008:584). If remittances 
are motivated by altruism, one can expect remittances to increase in response to adverse 
conditions back home.  
Migrant remittances can also be motivated by self-interest. Migrants can send remittances with 




A number of authors find that remittances are motivated by a combination of altruistic and self-
interest motives, Lucas and Stark (1985), for example, suggest “tempered altruism” or 
“enlightened self-interest” to refer to a combination of altruistic and self-interest motives.  
Lucas and Stark’s analytical framework was a significant component in the development of the 
New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM). The NELM differs from the traditional 
neoclassical approach to labour migration, which posits that decisions about migration are 
made on an individual basis. The primary principles of the NELM are that decisions regarding 
remittances are related to decisions about migration and that these decisions must be 
understood at the household level (Carling, 2008:584). Migrant workers enter into contractual 
insurance agreements with household members back home and send remittances when 
households experience shocks. At the same time, households support migrants by, for example, 
paying the costs of migration or supporting the migrant during periods of unemployment 
(Carling, 2008:584). This co-insurance agreement between migrants and households reduces 
household risks for family members back home.  
In summary, migrants have a number of motives for sending remittances. The motives for 
remitting depend on the circumstances of both migrant senders and remittance recipients and 
should be viewed as complementary (Kamuleta, 2014:17). 
3.1.2 Macro level 
Studies have identified a number of macroeconomic factors that determine remittance flows, 
including: economic conditions in a migrant’s home and host country; the stock of migrant 
workers in the host country, economic policies and institutions in the home country, transaction 




 Economic conditions in a migrant’s home and host country 
Economic conditions in a migrant’s home country can determine the volume of remittances 
sent home. For example, adverse shocks to output, wages and employment in the home country 
can reduce household income and increase the need for remittances. Assuming migrants are 
motivated by altruism, this can encourage them to send more remittances home. Economic 
conditions in a migrant’s host country can also be a determinant of remittance flows. 
Favourable economic conditions in a migrant’s host country increase a migrant’s employment 
and earnings prospects, enabling migrants to send more money home. Using data from Latin 
American countries and the United State, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) investigated whether 
remittances are more responsive to changes in the macroeconomic conditions of the home 
country versus changes in the macroeconomic conditions of the host country. They found that 
remittances are mostly driven by changes in the macroeconomic conditions of the host country. 
 It is, however, possible that neither home nor host country macroeconomic conditions drive 
remittances. Remittances can be determined by demographic factors independent of changes 
in the macroeconomic conditions of the home and host countries. 
 Stock of migrant workers in the host country 
The stock of migrant workers in the host country is another significant determinant of 
remittances. Freund and Spatafora (2008:356) find that an increase in the stock of migrant 
workers leads to a proportionate increase in remittance flows.  
 Economic policies and institutions in a migrant’s home country 
Economic policies and institutions in a migrant’s home country can affect the inflow of 
remittances. The presence of exchange rate restrictions, for instance, can discourage migrants 
from sending remittances through formal channels (El-Sakka & McNabb, 1999). Likewise, 
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macroeconomic instability, such as real exchange rate overvaluation, can also discourage 
migrants from sending remittances through formal channels. Alternatively, financial sector 
development can encourage the flow of remittances through formal channels.  
 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs affect the way in which remittances are sent (Freund & Spatafora, 2005:357). 
In general, remittances can be sent through formal and informal channels. Formal channels 
include money transfer services provided by MTOs, banks and post offices; while informal 
channels include transfers sent by unofficial courier companies, relatives or friends. Globally, 
studies show that the cost of remitting money through informal channels is cheaper (Freund & 
Spatafora, 2005:357). Remittances sent through informal channels, however, are not recorded 
in the balance of payments. This understates the total volume of recorded remittances.  By 
affecting the way in which migrants remit money, transaction costs are a significant 
determinant of the total volume of officially recorded remittances.  
 Risks in the home country 
Risks in the home country, such as political instability, can discourage migrants from remitting, 
at least for investment purposes. A study by Wahba (1991) found that political instability and 
poor financial intermediation has a negative impact on the inflow of remittances. 
 Opportunities for investment 
Greater potential returns on assets in the host country can encourage migrants to invest their 
savings in the host country rather than remit money home; this is assuming the investment 
motive for remittances surpasses the altruistic motive. 
Though a number of potential determinants of remittances have been identified, the stock of 
migrant workers in a host country appears to be the most significant determinant of remittances 
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at the macro level (El-Sakka & Mcnabb, 1999; Chami, Fullenkamp & Jahjah, 2005; and Freund 
& Spatafora, 2005). 
3.2 Impact of remittances 
3.2.1 Household level 
This section reviews the literature on the impact of remittances at the household level. 
 Health
Remittances can improve health outcomes of recipient households by enabling households to 
spend more on healthcare services. Frank and Hummer (2002) reported a positive relationship 
between remittances and health outcomes for remittance-receiving households in Mexico. 
They found that children born in households that receive remittances are less likely to be 
exposed to health risks at birth. Similarly, Hildebrant and McKenzie (2005) found that 
migration from Mexico to the United States has a positive impact on child health outcomes; 
lowering rates of infant mortality and increasing birth weights (Hildebrandt & McKenzie, 
2005).  In a cross-country study analysing the relationship between remittances and health 
outcomes in 56 developing countries, Drabo and Ebeke (2010) found that an increase in 
remittances is associated with better access to private healthcare treatment. 
Although the empirical evidence on the impact of remittances on health outcomes in Africa is 
somewhat limited, household surveys conducted by the Africa Migration Project3 indicate that 
remittance-receiving households in Africa, particularly households receiving remittances from 
outside the continent, spend on average 5-12% of total remittances on healthcare (Ratha et al., 
2011:68). A similar share of remittances received domestically and within Africa is spent on 
3 The Africa Migration Project is a joint project undertaken by the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank in order to understand migration and remittances in Africa, with the objective of making informed policy 
recommendations for policymakers (World Bank, 2015c). 
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healthcare, although the average share is lower given the smaller volume of remittances 
flowing from within the continent. Birdsall and Chuhan (1986) found that remittance-receiving 
households in rural Mali increased demand for health services, particularly demand for private 
healthcare services. While using panel data for KwaZulu Natal, Nagarajan (2009) found that 
remittance-receiving households spend a larger share of their household budget on food and 
health expenditures.  
 Education 
Remittances reduce liquidity constraints faced by recipient households, enabling them to 
increase expenditure on education (Mara et al. 2012). A study by Adams and Cuecuecha 
(2010), for instance, found that in Guatemala households receiving international and internal 
remittances spend 58.1% and 45.2%, respectively, more on education than households that do 
not receive remittances. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) found that, in Mexico, children living in 
remittance-receiving households attained higher levels of schooling. While Cox-Edwards and 
Ureta (2003) found that in El Salvador, remittances reduce the likelihood of children leaving 
school (Cox-Edwards & Ureta, 2003).   
 Regarding Africa, household surveys by the Africa Migration Project indicate that expenditure 
on education is the second-highest use of international remittances in Nigeria and Uganda, the 
third highest in Burkina Faso and the fourth highest in Kenya (Ratha et al., 2011:66). With 
respect to domestic and intraregional remittances, remittance-receiving households in Kenya 
and Uganda, for example, typically spend 15% of domestic or intraregional remittances on 
education, while in Nigeria households typically spend 20% of domestic or intraregional 
remittances on education (Ratha et al., 2011:66).These figures indicate that a significant portion 
of remittances received in African countries are spent on education.   
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A study by Elbadawi and Roushdy (2010) found that in Egypt children living in remittance-
receiving households are more likely to complete tertiary education than children living in 
households that do not receive remittances. Further, they found that teenaged girls living in 
households that receive remittances do less household work and are more likely to be in school 
than girls living in households that do not receive remittances. Adams, Cuecuecha and Page 
(2008) found that remittance-receiving households in Ghana invested more in education than 
households that do not receive remittances. And using data from six countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Ratha (2013) found a strong positive relationship between remittances and the average 
number of household members with a secondary education. 
 Investment in physical capital and entrepreneurship 
Remittances can contribute to financial asset formation; improve investment opportunities; and 
promote entrepreneurship (Orozco et al., 2005). A study by Adams (1998) found that in rural 
Pakistan remittances increase the propensity to invest in agricultural land. While Woodruff and 
Zenteno (2001) found that a large portion of investments in microenterprises are financed by 
remittances.  
With respect to Africa, household surveys by the Africa Migration Project indicate that a 
significant share of remittances to Africa are spent on investments in property, farming, 
agricultural equipment, and investments in small businesses (Ratha et al., 2011:65). As a share 
of total remittances, investments in these items represent 57% in Nigeria, 55.3% in Kenya, 
36.4% in Burkina Faso, 20.2% in Uganda, and 15.5% in Senegal (Ratha et al., 2011:65).  
Some might argue that remittances do not contribute to investments in long-term financial or 
physical assets as they function primarily as a form of social insurance for recipient households 
and are not necessarily intended for long-term investment purposes.  
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 Insurance against external shocks
Migration enables remittance-receiving households to diversify their income sources, and by 
so doing reduces household vulnerability to external shocks. In the Aceh region of Indonesia, 
remittance-receiving households recovered quicker than households that did not receive 
remittances after a tsunami hit the region in 2004 (Wu, 2006). In El Salvador, an increase in 
remittances, following an earthquake in 2001, helped smooth household consumption 
(Halliday, 2006). While, in Haiti, remittances from relatives and friends in the US played a 
significant role in decreasing the damage caused by an earthquake in 2010 (Ratha, 2010).  
Remittances to Africa also function as a form of social insurance against external shocks (Block 
& Webb, 2001). In Botswana, Lucas and Stark (1985) found that remittance-receiving 
households, which rely on crops for their sustenance, receive more remittances during 
unfavourable environmental conditions. While Mohapatra, Joseph & Ratha (2009) found that 
remittance-receiving households in Ethiopia are less likely to sell their productive assets to 
cope with food shortages when faced with external shocks. 
3.2.2 National level 
 Stability and counter-cyclicality of remittances
Remittances tend to be more stable relative to other financial flows. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where private capital flows have fluctuated considerably over the years, remittances have 
consistently been less volatile (Gupta, Pattillo & Wagh, 2009).  
To the extent that they represent a stable and large source of foreign currency, remittances have 
been shown to “help sudden current account reversals during periods of economic instability, 
improve a country’s credit rating, and facilitate the inflow of new investments” (Amuedo-
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Dorantes & Pozo, 2004). Moreover, they are likely to stem investor uncertainty when foreign 
reserves are declining or when external debt is rising (Gupta, Pattillo & Wagh, 2009). 
Insofar as they are motivated by the altruism of migrant workers, remittances also tend to 
behave counter-cyclically.  They tend to increase in response to external shocks in recipient 
countries and decline when conditions are more favourable. The countercyclical nature of 
remittances is of particular importance in African countries, where variations in climatic 
conditions such as rainfall, floods and droughts have a marked bearing on economic growth. 
Quarterly and Blankson (2004) found that remittances to Ghana move counter cyclically with 
respect to the economic cycle and are beneficial in smoothing household consumption and 
welfare over time (Quartey & Blankson, 2004). Hence remittances behave differently to other 
private capital flows, which tend to be pro-cyclical.  
 Fiscal Policy 
Given that remittances enter recipient countries through household transfers, they can have an 
indirect impact on fiscal policy. One way in which they can impact fiscal policy is by expanding 
the tax base. Although remittances are not taxed directly they can indirectly increase 
government revenue from consumption-based taxation (Chami, Cosimano and Gapen, 2006). 
The impact on taxation, however, is dependent on the tax structure in place in recipient 
countries. Chami, Csimano and Gapen (2006) examined how remittances respond to the setting 
of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in recipient countries. They found that remittances 
increase income and consumption, expand the tax base and, by so doing, allow governments to 
incur additional expenditure and carry more debt. Chami, Hakura and Montiel (2012), 
however, argue that by enabling governments to carry more debt, without clearly showing the 
full cost of government actions, remittances could damage the quality of government 
institutions in receiving countries. Similarly, Chami and Fullenkamp (2013) found that, by 
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increasing government expenditure, remittances could enable governments to appropriate more 
resources and allocate them to those in power rather than invest in national development. 
Therefore, a moral hazard could arise because of the risk of government corruption. 
 Economic growth 
A number of studies have analysed the growth impact of remittances, however, results have 
not been conclusive. Remittances can have a positive impact on growth if an increase in 
remittances results in an increase in investment (Singh et al., 2010). This result can be large 
insofar as remittances improve credit constraints faced by households living in areas with 
underdeveloped financial systems (Woodruff & Zenteno, 2004). In the case where remittances 
are mostly consumed rather than invested, any effects on growth through higher investment are 
likely to be subdued (Woodruff & Zenteno, 2004:7). 
Some might argue that remittances can potentially reduce growth.  First, by increasing 
household consumption of non-tradable goods, remittances can increase the prices of 
domestically produced goods and appreciate the real exchange rate, the macroeconomic 
mechanism known as ‘Dutch Disease’ (Singh et al., 2010:8).  This effect can be harmful to 
long-term growth, as an appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the competitiveness of 
a country’s tradable sectors and can cause an increase in the current account deficit (Kireyev, 
2006). Using a panel of 13 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo (2004) found that a doubling of remittances results in an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2004). However, there is limited evidence of this 
effect occurring in African countries (Bourdet & Falck, 2006).  Second, by increasing 
household income and easing budget constraints, remittances can potentially reduce labour 
supply or labour market participation of recipients (Lucas 1987; Azam & Gubert, 2006; 
Bussolo & Medvedev, 2007; Chami et al., 2008). This can potentially lead to a decrease in 
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output growth. But there is little evidence that this phenomenon will have a significant impact 
on output in Africa, particularly in countries with high levels of unemployment (Kamuleta, 
2014).  
Thus, the complexity of the growth process and issues concerning cross-country growth 
regressions make it challenging to determine the impact of remittances on growth. On average, 
empirical studies that include remittances in cross-country growth regressions provide mixed 
results (Barajas et al., 2009; Catrinescu et al., 2009; Singh, Haacker & Lee, 2009). The absence 
of a significant relationship between remittances and growth in regressions indicates either that 
their impact on growth can only be realised over the long-run or that official remittances data 
are of a poor quality.   
3.3 Remittances, Inequality and Poverty 
3.3.1 Remittances and inequality 
Remittances are an important source of finance for many developing countries. Their impact 
on income inequality, however, is uncertain. While a number of studies suggest that 
remittances increase income inequality (Oberai & Singh, 1980; Stahl, 1982; Barham & 
Boucher, 1998; and Taylor et al., 2005), others suggest that they reduce it (Ahlburg, 1996). 
Barham and Boucher (1998) found that remittances increase income inequality in Nicaragua. 
Similarly, Oberai and Singh (1980) found that, in India, remittances increase inequality in rural 
areas. On the other hand, Ahlburg (1996) found that remittances reduce income inequality in 
Tonga. 
 Jones (1998) argues that the impact of remittances on income inequality is dependent on the 
migrant’s “stage” of migration in the host country and defines three stages of migration: the 
“innovative stage”, the “early adopter stage”, and the “later adopter stage”. The “innovative 
stage” is said to occur when only people from upper segments of the income distribution 
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migrate; in this stage remittances tend to increase inequality. The “early adopter stage” refers 
to the stage of the migration process where people from the lower segments of the income 
distribution begin to migrate as well; in this stage remittances tend to decrease inequality. The 
“later adopter stage” is said to occur when, owing to the increase in remittances, the income of 
remittance-receiving households is substantially greater than the income of households which 
do not receive remittances; in this stage remittances tend to increase inequality. 
Ultimately, the impact of remittances on inequality depends on where those who migrate or 
remit are situated in the distribution of income (Gonzalez-Konig & Wodon, 2005:2). If 
migration is more prevalent among individuals from poorer segments of the population, 
remittances are likely to be inequality decreasing as typically poorer families will receive the 
additional income. Alternatively, if migration is more prevalent among individuals from richer 
segments of the population, remittances are likely to increase income inequality as 
comparatively richer households will benefit from them. 
3.3.2 Remittances and poverty 
A number of studies have analysed the impact of remittances on poverty. Overall, the literature 
provides evidence to support the hypothesis that remittances reduce poverty as, unlike other 
private financial flows, they are directly received by the poor (Ratha et al., 2011:60). 
Remittances directly impact poverty by augmenting the income and consumption of poor 
remittance-receiving households. They also indirectly affect poverty and welfare in recipient 
countries through their multiplier- and macroeconomic effects. This section reviews the 
empirical literature on the impact of remittances on poverty.  
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3.3.2.1 Household level 
At the household level, Stahl (1982) and Adams (1991) pioneered efforts to collect data that 
can be used to analyse the welfare effects of remittances (Stahl, 1982). Using a sample of 1000 
households from three villages across rural Egypt, Adams (1991) found that the number of 
poor households decreases by 9.8% when international remittances are included in household 
income. Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovskim, and Glinskaya (2007) studied the impact of migration 
and remittances on poverty in Nepal over the period 1995-2004. They found that an increase 
in the stock of migrants and remittances leads to a decrease in poverty. Using household survey 
data, Brown and Jimenez (2008) found migration and remittances to reduce poverty in Fiji and 
Tonga. Recently, Bertoli and Marchetta (2014) found evidence of the poverty reducing impact 
of remittances in Ecuador.  
Evidence for African countries also points to the poverty-reducing impact of remittances.  
Using household survey data from 1994-1995, Lachaud (1999) found remittances to reduce 
rural poverty in Burkina Faso by 7.2% and urban poverty by 3.2%. While Adams and 
Cuecuecha (2013) found that, in Ghana, remittances reduce the likelihood of a household living 
in poverty by half. 
Although these findings provide useful insights into the direction of the relationship between 
remittances and poverty, a number of them are of limited use owing to their small sample size. 
For example, Adams (1991) conducted his analysis using a sample of 1000 households from 
three villages across rural Egypt.  
3.3.2.2 Cross-country 
Cross-country empirical evidence on the impact of remittances on poverty is somewhat limited. 
Empirical studies have generally focused on the impact of remittances on poverty for particular 
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village- and country settings. Pioneering works by Adams and Page (2005), however, led to 
the building of a database on remittances, poverty and inequality, enabling researchers to 
examine the remittances-poverty nexus in developing countries.  Jongwanich (2007) and 
Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) have used this database on remittances, poverty and inequality 
to estimate the impact of remittances on poverty for countries in the Asian-Pacific and Sub-
Saharan African regions. Similarly, Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) analysed the relationship 
between remittances and poverty for a panel of 34 African countries. Each of the above 
mentioned papers is reviewed below, and a summary of the papers is presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Cross-country empirical evidence of poverty and remittances relationship 
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32 
 Adams and Page (2005)
Adams and Page (2005) estimated the impact of migration and remittances on poverty for 71 
developing countries over the period 1980 to 1998. Three measures of poverty were used: the 
poverty headcount, the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap ratios, which measure the 
depth, intensity and severity of poverty respectively. The poverty model was specified as: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1log⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2log⁡(𝑔𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
where P is a measure of poverty in country i at time t;⁡𝛼𝑖 captures fixed effects; 𝛽1 is the growth 
elasticity of poverty with respect to income, 𝑦; 𝛽2 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
income inequality, 𝑔; 𝛽3 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to remittances, 𝑟; 𝛽4 is a 
dummy variable capturing regional effects; and 𝜀 is an error term capturing errors in the poverty 
measure used.  
The poverty elasticity of migration and remittances were estimated separately and both 
migration and remittances were found to reduce poverty.  
The study used instrumental variables (IV) to deal with the possibility of reverse causality 
between migration, remittances and poverty. Three instruments were used for migration and 
remittances: the distance from the remittance-sending to the recipient countries; the level of 
educational attainment in the recipient countries; and government stability. Using the IV 
approach, equation (3) was estimated in two stages. The first stage involved regressing 
migration and remittances against the chosen instruments and including income, the Gini 
coefficient, and regional dummies as exogenous variables. The second stage involved taking 
the instrumented migration and remittance variables and including them in the poverty 
regression to estimate their poverty elasticity. Instrumenting for migration and remittances and 
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controlling for income, inequality and regional effects, migration and remittances were still 
found to reduce poverty.  
 Jongwanich (2007)  
Jongwanich (2007) estimated the impact of remittances on poverty for developing Asian-
Pacific countries. The estimated poverty equation was of the form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1log⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2log⁡(𝑔𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4) 
The study included additional control variables (within the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡): human capital, inflation 
and openness. It was found that a 10% increase in remittances leads to a 2.8% decrease in 
poverty.  
Jongwanich’s (2007) results, however, must be accepted with a degree of caution as the study 
did not account for the possible reverse causality between remittances and poverty. 
 Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) 
Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) used an updated database on remittances, poverty and 
inequality to estimate the poverty elasticity of remittances. The database consisted of 76 
developing countries, with a focus on countries from the Sub-Saharan African region. The 
direct poverty elasticity of remittances was first estimated using equation (5) below. 
Subsequently, the Three Stage Least Square (3SLS) estimator, which allows for poverty and 
remittances to be determined simultaneously as a system of equations, was used. The system 
of equations was made of a poverty model and a model capturing the determinants of 
remittances: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1log⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2log⁡(𝑔𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1log⁡(𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2log⁡(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽5(𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (6) 
where remittances (equation 6) are modelled as a function of poverty (𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡), trade openness 
⁡(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡), educational attainment (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡), distance (in miles) from the host country to the 
recipient country (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡), a dual exchange rate dummy (𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡), and lagged remittances 
(𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡−1).  
Two of the variables included in the remittance equation (6) were also included as instruments 
in the Adams and Page (2005) study. 
Controlling for the possible reverse causality between remittances and poverty, the study found 
that, on average, a 10% increase in the share of remittances in GDP leads to a 1.5% decrease 
in the poverty headcount ratio.  
 Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) 
Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) estimated the impact of remittances on poverty using a dataset 
of 33 African countries over the period 1990-2005. To control for the possible endogeneity 
between remittances and poverty, they used the two-stage Generalised Method of Moments 
Instrumental Variables (GMM-IV) estimator to instrument for remittances. The first stage of 
the GMM-IV estimator involved regressing the remittance variable (𝑟𝑖𝑡)  against its first and 
second lags and including income, the Gini index, the illiteracy rate, trade openness and 
inflation as exogenous variables. The second stage involved taking the instrumented 
remittances variable and including it in the poverty model to estimate the poverty elasticity of 
remittances. They found that a 10% increase in remittances (as a share of GDP) leads to a 2.9% 
decrease in the poverty headcount.  
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Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) results, however, must also be accepted with a degree of 
caution as they had a small sample size of only 51 observations.  
One of the common limitations of previous cross-country studies is that a number of them fail 
to account for the possible endogeneity between remittances and poverty. Endogenous 
variables are correlated with the disturbance term; this violates the Gauss-Markov assumption 
that the regressors and the error term are uncorrelated. Failing to account for endogeneity when 
endogeneity is present can bias the estimation results. An additional limitation of previous 
cross-country studies is that they do not account for unobservable country specific factors, 
meaning there could be latent heterogeneity present in the errors. Although heterogeneity will 
generally not interfere with consistent parameter estimation, failing to account for it will yield 
inconsistent estimates of the standard errors of the estimated parameters and can invalidate 
statistical inferences. This study accounts for the possible endogeneity and heteroscedasticity 
in the model by employing the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Generalised Least Squares 
(GLS) estimation techniques.  
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Chapter Four 
Methodology and Data 
This chapter discusses the modelling methodology and the data used in the study. 
4.1 Model formation and functional form 
The main objective of the study is to assess the impact of remittances on poverty. Therefore 
we begin with a basic poverty model and then incorporate remittances in order to determine 
their effect on poverty. In evaluating the relationship between remittances and poverty, we 
build on the basic growth-poverty model suggested by Ravillion and Chen (1997). Ravallion 
and Chen (1997) were one of the first to develop a growth-poverty model using cross-country 
aggregate data.4  Following the empirical works of Adams and Page (2003) and Gupta, Pattillo 
and Wagh (2009), the basic growth-poverty model is expanded to include income inequality 
and the variable of interest, remittances. The baseline specification for the model is given by: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1log⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2log⁡(𝑔𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡              (7) 
where P represents a measure of poverty in country i at time t,⁡𝛼𝑖 captures fixed effects; 𝛽1 is 
the growth elasticity of poverty with respect to income, 𝑦; 𝛽2 is the elasticity of poverty with 
respect to income inequality, 𝑔; and 𝛽3 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to remittances, 
𝑟; 𝜀 is an error term capturing errors in the poverty measure used. 
Equation (7) is estimated to identify the impact of remittances on poverty.  Aside from 
remittances, other foreign currency inflows may have an impact on poverty, and the study 
expands upon previous work by incorporating exports and ODA.  
4 Ravallion and Chen (1997) used data from 42 developing countries to estimate how absolute poverty levels have 
changed over time. 
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One of the ways in which exports may have an impact on poverty is through their impact on 
employment and wages (Winters et al. 2004). In line with traditional trade theory, exports are 
particularly beneficial for the poor in developing countries. The Hechscher-Ohlin model 
indicates that countries with an abundance of unskilled labour will have a comparative 
advantage in products that are labour intensive (Thelle, et al., 2015). Under the assumption that 
most of the poor in developing countries are unskilled, increased demand for unskilled labour 
will in turn increase employment prospects and wages. Therefore, in theory, the opportunity 
for direct poverty reduction from exports should be significant.  
 
ODA is specifically targeted to the poorest countries to facilitate economic development. So 
ODA can potentially lead to faster growth which translates into poverty reduction and 
improved social outcomes (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998; Burnside & Dollar, 1998; Collier & 
Dollar, 2000).  
By incorporating exports and ODA in the model, the study seeks to determine the significance 
of remittances on poverty relative to other foreign currency flows. This would help in informing 
policy of African countries’ sources of financing for development.  
Along with the additional foreign currency flows, the model includes income group dummy 
variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Countries that share similar 
characteristics often face similar challenges (Sy & Rakotondrazaka, 2015:4). Therefore, using 
the World Bank’s income group classification, countries are classified into low-income, lower-
middle- and upper-middle-income groups, based on their gross national income (GNI) per 
capita. GNI per capita is a useful income group measure as it reflects the average income levels 
of a country’s citizens. Furthermore it is related to other indicators that measure the economic 
and social well-being of a country and its people.  
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Integrating the additional variables, the adapted model is specified as: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1log⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2log⁡(𝑔𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑖𝑡) +⁡𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽6𝐷1 + 𝛽7𝐷2 + ⁡𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (8) 
where P,⁡𝛼𝑖 ⁡,⁡𝛽1⁡,⁡𝛽2⁡,⁡𝛾 and 𝜀 are as previously defined; 𝛽4 and 𝛽5 are the coefficients for 
exports and ODA respectively; and 𝛽6 and 𝛽7⁡are the coefficients for the lower- and upper-
middle-income group dummy variables.5 The model is expressed as a log-linear model. The 
appeal in using a log-linear model is that it enables the slope coefficients to be interpreted as 
elasticities (Gujarati,1995:180).   
In order to control for income differences between countries, per capita GDP is used as a 
control variable. The model assumes that poverty is reduced as per capita income rises (Gupta, 
Pattillo & Wagh, 2009), therefore  𝛽1 is expected to be negative (𝛽1 < 0). 
In theory, higher poverty levels are associated with higher levels of income inequality (Gupta, 
Pattillo & Wagh, 2009), thus 𝛽2 is expected to be positive⁡(𝛽2 > 0). 
Controlling for income and its distribution, the study estimates the sign and magnitude of the 
coefficient for remittances (𝛽3), exports (𝛽4) and ODA (𝛽5).  A priori, we expect that a negative 
coefficient for remittances would indicate that remittances have a positive impact on poverty 
reduction.  Given that low-income countries generally have higher poverty rates (Sumner, 
2012:7), the coefficients of the lower- and upper-middle-income group dummy variables, 𝛽6⁡ 
and 𝛽7, are expected to be negative (𝛽6⁡, 𝛽7 < 0). 
5 Low-income countries are taken as the reference group. 
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4.2 Data sources 
The dataset consists of 32 countries with a total of 130 observations.6 Secondary data is 
employed over the period 1983 to 2013. The poverty and income inequality data are from the 
World Bank’s PovcalNet database which releases estimates of global poverty from 1981 to 
2012. The common international poverty line, currently set at $1.90 in 2011 Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) exchange rates, is used. The use of PPP exchange rates ensures that $1.90 is valued 
roughly the same in all countries. Data for all the other variables are from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators, supplemented with data from the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) Balance of Payments Statistics. Given that the poverty estimates are based on 
household surveys that take place every few years, the analysis includes countries that have at 
least two nationally-representative household surveys.  
4.3 Variable descriptions 
Poverty is modelled as a function of income, income inequality, remittances, exports and ODA, 
and income group dummy variables are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity 




                                                 
6 See Appendix A, Table A-1 for raw data. 
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Table 4. Summary of variables used in the study 




Percentage of population living in 
households with income below the 
poverty line 
PovcalNet database 
Poverty gap ratio 
(𝑃1) 
Distance by which the average income of 
the poor deviates from the poverty line 





Measures changes in the distribution of 
income 
PovcalNet database 
per capita GDP 
(𝑦)
Income measure (in constant 2005 US 
dollars) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Remittances (𝑟) Sum of personal transfers and 
compensation of employees (expressed as 
a percentage of GDP) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and Balance of Payments 
Statistics (BOPS) 
Exports (𝑥) Value of goods and services provided to 
the rest of the world 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
ODA (𝑎) Grants and loans made on concessional 
terms  





Countries classified into low-income, 
lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income 
groups based on per capita GNI 
World Bank GNI per capita 





Sum of imports and exports (expressed as 
a percentage of GDP) 








Source: Compiled by author. 
 Poverty measures
Two poverty measures are used: the poverty headcount and the poverty gap ratios. The poverty 
headcount ratio measures the percentage of the population living in households with income or 
expenditures below the poverty line. The advantage of using the poverty headcount ratio is that 
it can be easily constructed and understood. However, it fails to account for the intensity of 
poverty. Furthermore, it fails to give an indication of how poor the poor are and therefore does 
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not change if households living below the poverty line become poorer (Haughton & Khandker, 
2009:69). Accordingly, the poverty gap ratio, which takes into account the depth of poverty, is 
used as an alternative poverty measure.  The poverty gap ratio measures the distance by which 
the average income of the poor deviates from the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line. The gap ratio may be thought of as the minimum cost of eliminating poverty, as 
it indicates how much would have to be transferred to the poor to bring their incomes up to the 
poverty line (Haughton & Khandker, 2009:69). 
 per capita GDP
Per capita GDP is used as the income measure. Income, as measured by per capita GDP, is 
from the national accounts and is in constant 2005 US dollars (World Bank, 2015b). 
 Income inequality
Changes in the distribution of income are measured using the Gini coefficient. The Gini 
coefficient provides a convenient summary measure of the degree of income inequality in a 
given country. A Gini coefficient of 0 signifies equal income for all persons; while a coefficient 
of 100 means that all income is concentrated in one person (World Bank, 2015d). 
 Remittances
Remittances are the sum of two components in the balance of payments, personal transfers and 
compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of current transfers between resident 
and non-resident households, and compensation of employees refers to the income of short-
term seasonal workers employed in economies where they are non-residents and the income of 
residents employed by non-resident entities (World Bank, 2015b). It is important to note that 
unofficial remittance flows account for a significant portion of total remittances. Aggarwal, 
Dermiguc-Kunt and Peria (2006) estimate that about 50-250% of total remittances are 
accounted for by unofficial remittance flows. Therefore recorded remittances are likely to be 




Exports refer to the value of goods and services provided to the rest of the world (World Bank, 
2015b). 
 ODA 
ODA is all financing that flows from developed country governments and multilateral agencies 
to the developing world (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998:6). ODA is primarily the official 
government-to-government transfer of financial and technical resources for the programs of 
social and economic development (Raheem & Ogebe, 2014). It consists of grants and loans 
made on concessional terms and given by; multilateral institutions, countries in the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD), and by non-DAC countries to countries and territories in the DAC list 
of ODA recipients (World Bank, 2015b).  
 Income group dummy variables  
The model includes income group dummy variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries. Countries that share similar characteristics often face similar challenges (Sy 
& Rakotondrazaka, 2015:4). Therefore, using the World Bank’s income group classification,  
countries are classified into low-income, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income groups 
based on their per capita Gross National Income (GNI). Using 2014 GNI values, low-income 
countries are those with a per capita GNI of $1,045 or less; lower-middle-income countries are 
those with a per capita GNI of over $1,045 but less than $4,125; and upper-middle-income 
income economies are those with a per capita GNI of over $4,125 but less than $12,736 (World 
Bank, 2015e). 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the regression variables. On average, 43.4% of 
households live below the $1.90 international poverty line. The poverty gap ratio indicates that 
the average income gap between households living below the poverty line and the actual 
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poverty line is 18.3%. These ratios, however, differ significantly across countries and across 
time (see Table A-1 in Appendix A). For example, in 2010 the headcount ratio for Madagascar 
is 81.8%, while the headcount ratio for Tunisia is only 2%.  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for regression variables 
Observations Mean Std. Min Max 
Poverty headcount 142 43.42 24.50 1.68 92.31 
Poverty gap 142 18.30 13.86 0.31 62.96 
per capita GDP 984 1131.59 1309.22 113.71 6930.85 
Gini index 142 44.40 8.73 28.9 74.33 
Remittances (% of GDP) 900 4.76 11.35 0.003 106.46 
Exports (% of GDP) 979 27.87 14.82 2.52 100.95 
ODA (% of GDP) 973 10.86 10.78 0.0004 94.44 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table 6 presents the pairwise bivariate correlations of the regression variables. The pairwise 
correlations show a negative relationship between remittances and both poverty measures at 
the 10% level of significance, suggesting that poverty decreases as remittances increase. 
Exports are negatively correlated with poverty, while ODA is positively correlated with 
poverty. In order to examine this further, the OLS and 2SLS estimation results are considered 
next. 
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Gini index 0.29*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 1.00 
Remittances 
(% of GDP) 





0.64*** 0.28*** 0.16*** 1.00 




-0.17** 0.14*** -0.38*** 1.00





We first use a standard OLS model for the poverty headcount and the poverty gap. Next we 
consider the possible violations of the Gauss-Markov assumptions of homoscedasticity and 
exoogeneity. We use appropriate estimation techniques to tackle these issues.  
5.1 Ordinary Least Squares estimation 
Table 7.Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 Poverty headcount  Poverty gap 










































Observations 130 130 
Adjusted R^2  0.69 0.72 
F-statistic 37.40*** 42.40*** 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 7 above illustrates the results when equation (8) is estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). As stated previously, equation (8) models poverty as a function of income, 
income inequality and remittances, exports and ODA. All variables are in logs.   
5.1.1 Poverty headcount ratio 
Column 2 (Table 7) illustrates the results when poverty is measured using the headcount ratio. 
The coefficient for per capita GDP is negative and indicates that, on average, if income 
increases by 10%, ceteris paribus, the headcount ratio is expected to decrease by 6.5%.  
The Gini coefficient carries a positive sign and is significant. This supports the hypothesis that 
greater inequality is associated with higher poverty.  
The coefficient for remittances is significant and indicates that a 10% increase in the share of 
remittances in GDP is expected to lead to an approximate 1% decrease in the headcount poverty 
ratio, ceteris paribus. This outcome is similar to that found by Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) 
who found that a 10% increase in remittances is associated with an estimated 1% fall in the 
poverty headcount ratio. On the other hand, using a sample of 33 African countries, Anyanwu 
and Erhikakpor (2010) found that a 10% increase in the share of remittances in GDP reduces 
the headcount ratio by 2.7%. Their findings, however, were limited by a small sample size of 
only 51 observations. 
As previously mentioned, the model includes income group dummy variables to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Countries that share similar characteristics often 
face similar challenges (Sy & Rakotondrazaka, 2015:4). Using the World Bank’s income group 
classification, countries are classified into low-income, lower-middle- and upper-middle-
income groups, based on their gross national income (GNI) per capita. The dummy variable 
constants tell us that, keeping all else constant, the poverty headcount ratio is expected to be 
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47% lower in lower-middle-income countries, than in low-income countries. Similarly, the 
headcount ratio is expected to be 58% lower in upper-middle-income countries, than in low-
income countries.  Thus low-income countries generally have higher rates of poverty incidence 
and a larger poverty gap than middle-income countries (Sumner, 2012:7).  
 Exports are found to have an insignificant effect on poverty. This is unexpected given that one 
would expect exports to positively contribute towards poverty reduction, at least indirectly 
through higher GDP. Nonetheless, this result is line with the outcome obtained by Thelle et al., 
(2015). Using a sample of 78 countries, over the period 1996 to 2010, they found that, on 
average, exports do not in themselves have a significant impact on poverty outcomes.  
Equally surprising, ODA flows are found to have an insignificant impact on poverty. Arvin 
and Barillas (2010:2155) obtained the same result when testing for the causal link between 
ODA and poverty.  Such donor aid is often used for political or commercial interests, objectives 
that are not always consistent with poverty reduction; consequently, the gains from ODA do 
not always reach the poor.  A technical reason behind the lack of a significant relationship 
between ODA and poverty may be explained by the methodology used to estimate the sign of 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) concessional financing, which assumes a constant 
10% discount rate and thus over-estimates concessional financing.  
Dollar and Pritchett (1998) suggest that for ODA to be more effective in decreasing poverty it 
needs to be specifically targeted to developing countries with sound economic policies and 
management. In a good policy environment, financial assistance could promote economic 
growth which could translate to poverty reduction.  However, in a poor policy environment, 
financial assistance would have less of an impact on growth and poverty outcomes. The poor 
are therefore more likely to benefit from the gains of both exports and ODA when there are 
complementary policies in place.  
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5.1.2 Poverty gap ratio 
Column 3 (Table 7) illustrates the results when poverty is measured using the poverty gap ratio. 
As previously defined, the poverty gap ratio measures the distance by which the average 
income of the poor deviates from the poverty line (expressed as a percentage of the poverty 
line). Note that the regression results are broadly similar to those for the poverty headcount.  
Income is found to have a negative relationship with poverty,  and the coefficient is 
substantially more negative (-0.96 versus -0.65) suggesting that income has a larger  impact on 
closing the mean income shortfall from the poverty line than it has on bringing people out of 
poverty.  
Using the poverty gap ratio, the coefficient for remittances is not different to that of the poverty 
headcount ratio (-0.10 and -0.09 respectively).  
The Gini coefficient remains positive and statistically significant; however the magnitude of 
the coefficient, under the poverty gap ratio, is larger. 
Exports and ODA still have a statistically insignificant effect on poverty when using the 
poverty gap.  
In summary, both the regression results support the hypothesis that remittances have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on poverty reduction. Exports and ODA have no impact on 
poverty, which suggests that the gains from exports and ODA fail to trickle down to the poor. 
Note that when exports and ODA are excluded from the regression, the coefficient for 
remittances remains about the same.  
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5.2 Gauss-Markov Assumptions 
5.2.1 Homoscedasticity of the errors 
OLS assumes that the errors are homoscedastic, with the same variance across countries and 
across time. However, this may be a restrictive assumption for this study. The estimated impact 
of remittances on poverty may be biased by unobservable country specific factors, which either 
cannot be measured or have not been accounted for. In other words, there could be latent 
heterogeneity present in the errors. Although this will generally not interfere with consistent 
parameter estimation, failing to account for the presence of heterogeneity will yield 
inconsistent estimates of the standard errors of the estimated parameters and can invalidate 
statistical inferences (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). The Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimator 
can be considered as an alternative to the OLS estimator. In the presence of panel-level 
heteroscedasticity, GLS provides efficient estimates over OLS (Arrelano, 2003: 20). The GLS 
estimator transforms the model equation into a new model by assigning weights to the errors. 
The variances of the errors in the transformed model are equal and constant, thus removing the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. A simple derivation of the GLS estimator is provided in 
Appendix B.  
Table 8 provides the results when Equation (8) is estimated using the GLS estimator. A 
likelihood ratio test is performed and confirms the presence of panel-level heteroscedasticity; 
this justifies the use of the GLS estimator. The results of the likelihood ratio test can be found 
in Appendix C, Table C-1.  
Table 8 below repeats the results of Table 7 but uses the GLS estimator to adjust for 
heteroscedasticity. As expected, the GLS coefficients are of the same sign and magnitude of 
OLS coefficients, however the standard errors are slightly smaller. The smaller standard errors 
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under the GLS estimator point to the efficiency of the GLS estimation results over the OLS 
results.  
Table 8. Generalised Least Squares Estimation 
 Poverty headcount  Poverty gap 


















































Observations 130 130 
Adjusted R^2  0.69 0.72 
Wald chi2 321.48 364.40 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
5.2.2 Exogeneity of the variables  
The relationship between remittances and poverty may not be unidirectional. There is a 
possibility of reverse causality, which would make remittances endogenous to poverty. 
Endogenous variables are correlated with the disturbance term; this violates the Gauss-Markov 
assumption that the regressors and the error term are uncorrelated. To take account of the 
possible endogeneity between remittances and poverty the study adopts the Two Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) estimation technique. The 2SLS approach replaces the endogenous remittances 
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variable⁡(𝑟) with predicted values of the variable (?̂?). A simple derivation of the 2SLS estimator 
is provided in Appendix B.  
In the first-stage of the 2SLS estimation technique, the endogenous remittances variable (𝑟) is 
regressed on the exogenous variables, per capita GDP ⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡)  and the Gini coefficient(𝑔𝑖𝑡), and 
a set of instruments. In applying 2SLS, the study uses instruments suggested by the literature 
that can impact remittance flows. The instruments used are lagged remittances, trade and 
educational attainment. Lagged remittances are included to capture the dynamic effect. Given 
the stable nature of remittance flows, the expectation is that lagged remittances are a significant 
predictor of current remittances. The second instrument used is trade openness. Trade 
openness, as measured by the trade to GDP ratio, represents how open an economy is. The final 
instrument used is educational attainment.  Educational attainment represents the average years 
of schooling among the over 25 population. The outcome of this variable depends on whether 
migration is more prevalent among the more educated or less educated members of a 
population (Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, 2009).   
Once the-first stage regression is estimated, the predicted values of the endogenous remittances 
variable (?̂?) are substituted in the poverty regression:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 log(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2 log(𝑔𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 log(?̂?𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷1 + 𝛽7𝐷2 + ⁡𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (9) 
Table 9 shows the results of the 2SLS estimation.7 When instrumenting for remittances the 
results are consistent with the OLS estimation results, with some variation in the size of some 
coefficients.  
In order to justify the use of the instrumented remittances variable, we test for endogeneity 
using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. The DWH test estimates the first-stage regression 
7 Table C-2 in Appendix C. 
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model by regressing remittances against the exogenous variables and the instruments. This is 
followed by substituting the predicted values of the residuals (?̂?) from the first-stage regression 
into the poverty regression. The regressors are exogenous if the coefficient of the residuals is 
not significantly different from zero.  
Table C-3 in Appendix C presents the results of the DWH test. The DWH test statistic is not 
significantly different from zero, therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
This result affirms that remittances are exogenous to poverty.    
Table 9.Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
Poverty headcount Poverty gap 




























Observations 83 83 
R^2 0.71 0.75 
Wald chi2 206.25 241.09 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusion 
This study uses data on remittances, poverty and inequality from 32 countries across Africa to 
examine the impact of remittances on poverty in Africa. The study expands upon previous work 
by including two additional foreign currency flows in the standard poverty-remittance model, 
exports and ODA.  
Controlling for heteroscedasticity we find that, on average, a 10% increase in the share of 
remittances in GDP leads to an approximate 1% decrease in the poverty headcount ratio, ceteris 
paribus. This outcome is supported by Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) who find that a 10% 
increase in remittances is associated with an estimated 1% fall in the headcount ratio. Using 
the poverty gap ratio, the coefficient for remittances is not different to that of the poverty 
headcount ratio (-0.10 and -0.09 respectively).  
A number of cross-country studies from other developing regions, however, show remittances 
to have more of a significant impact on poverty. For example, Jongwanich (2007) estimated 
the impact of remittances on poverty for developing Asian-Pacific countries and found that a 
10% increase in remittances leads to a 2.8% decrease in poverty. While Adams and Page (2005) 
estimated the impact of migration and remittances on poverty for 71 developing countries and 
found remittances to reduce poverty by 3.5%. Thus, remittances appear to have a smaller 
impact on poverty in Africa compared to other continents across the world. This is mainly 
attributed to the high cost of sending remittances to Africa relative to other developing regions. 
Therefore, by reducing remittance transaction costs in Africa, remittances may have more of 
an impact on poverty and development outcomes.  
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Exports are found to have an insignificant effect on poverty. This is unexpected given that one 
would expect exports to positively contribute towards poverty reduction, at least indirectly 
through higher GDP. Equally surprising, ODA flows are found to have an insignificant impact 
on poverty. 
In summary, the regression results support the hypothesis that remittances have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on poverty reduction. Exports and ODA have no impact on 
poverty, which suggests that the gains from exports and ODA fail to trickle down to the poor. 
Note that when exports and ODA are excluded from the regression, the coefficient for 
remittances remains about the same. Thus, remittances appear to be a major source of 
development finance to Africa.  
6.2 Recommendations 
Despite the growing importance of remittances as a source of finance for development, Africa’s 
high remittance costs limit their full impact on poverty and development outcomes. A number 
of factors contribute to maintain Africa’s high transaction cost structure, these include: “limited 
competition, regulatory practices that limit market entry, and a lack of financial inclusion in 
African countries” (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:24). 
 
Exclusivity agreements involving major MTOs and commercial banks are one of the drivers of 
Africa’s high remittance costs as they restrict competition (Watkins & Quattri, 2014:24). 
Exclusivity agreements with commercial banks allow MTOs to carry out transactions through 
designated banks (Ratha, Mohapatra, & Scheja, 2011). These agreements have the effect of 
reducing competition, increasing the cost of market entry and creating highly segmented 
markets characterised by limited competition.  
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The G7 and the G20 have taken a number of steps to reduce the high transaction costs of 
remittances (Watkins & Quattri, 2014). In 2008, the G7 adopted a quantitative goal towards 
halving the average global cost of remittances, from 10% to 5% over five years (Watkins & 
Quattri, 2014). Although this commitment has been reaffirmed and taken up in a number of 
countries, the commitment has had no discernible effect on the high transaction costs in African 
countries.  
Reducing remittance transaction costs in Africa and increasing transparency and 
competitiveness in the market for remittances will maximise the flow of remittances directly 
to the hands of recipients. Moreover, formalising remittance transaction services will help 
reduce the cost of sending remittances and will leverage remittances for development purposes 
(Kamuleta, 2014:50). 
6.2.1 Recommendations for policy and regulation 
Efforts need to be taken to reduce the costs of remitting money to and within Africa. At present, 
high transaction costs limit the impact that remittances can have on development outcomes in 
African countries. Reducing the costs of remittances will facilitate the use of remittances for 
developmental outcomes. 
Regulatory authorities need to permit post offices and microfinance institutions to play a 
greater role in the market for remittances in Africa. Post offices and microfinance institutions 
offer more coverage, particularly in rural areas where formal financial services are often 
limited.  Allowing more RSPs to operate in the remittance market and perform money transfers 
will bring about greater competition, with potential benefits for price and service quality 
(Watkins & Quattri, 2014:28).  
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Given that remittances are private transfers, their primary objective is not to support economic 
development. Therefore, it is important to understand, at an individual level, how they are used 
and the type of development activities they are invested in. For that reason, policymakers need 
to work directly with migrants and Diasporas, while collectively addressing the specific 
impediments that inhibit the developmental use of remittances (Kamuleta, 2014:61).  
Lastly, regulatory authorities should vigorously assess the practices of MTOs. In a market 
dominated by such limited competition, there is a risk of monopolistic abuse. This calls for 
anti-trust bodies to investigate whether exclusivity agreements involving MTOs inflate costs 
in remittance markets and prevent consumers benefiting from competition.  
6.2.2 Recommendations for further research 
The availability of poverty and remittances data was one of the major limitations of the study. 
Poverty data are based on household surveys that only take place every few years. Moreover, 
a number of African countries generally do not record or publish data on international 
remittances. In view of this, more attention needs to be paid to collecting and reporting data on 
remittances in African countries in order to capture their magnitude (as accurately as possible) 
and to understand their contribution to development outcomes.  
RSPs, their cost structures, and transaction costs are moderately understood. Therefore, an 
improved knowledge base is needed to guide policy and regulation changes in order to improve 
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Appendix A: Data for regression analysis 


























Algeria UM 1988 7.1 1.05 2579.94 40.19 379 0.64 15.51 0.29 
Algeria LM 1995 6.38 1.27 2339.66 35.33 1120 2.68 26.19 0.70 
Benin L 2003 48.85 16.25 535.95 38.58 55.36 1.56 20.98 8.43 
Benin L 2011 53.11 18.98 552.62 43.44 171.96 2.36 14.26 9.47 
Botswana LM 1986 42.56 17.87 2619.57 54.21 37.25 2.67 68.33 7.23 
Botswana LM 1993 34.82 13.49 3878.59 60.79 74.29 1.79 47.10 3.12 
Botswana UM 2003 29.75 11.41 5108.25 64.73 38.87 0.52 48.83 0.37 
Botswana UM 2009 18.24 5.78 5695.95 60.46 15.21 0.15 34.80 2.72 
Burkina Faso L 1994 83.06 48.44 279.12 48.07 80.35 4.24 14.20 22.83 
Burkina Faso L 1998 81.61 42.99 334.45 49.94 71.67 2.56 12.81 14.26 
Burkina Faso L 2003 57.26 23.71 380.33 43.25 53.75 1.28 8.71 12.86 
Burkina Faso L 2009 55.29 19.94 446.71 39.76 95.99 1.15 12.70 12.93 
Cameroon L 1996 48.08 15.29 806.46 44.45 13.41 0.14 23.38 4.21 
Cameroon L 2001 23.12 6.07 883.91 42.14 20.31 0.21 21.92 4.75 
Cameroon LM 2007 29.27 8.32 926.72 42.82 167.34 0.82 23.93 9.43 
Cape Verde LM 2002 21.02 6.05 1739.00 50.52 85.08 13.70 32.55 14.74 
Cape Verde LM 2007 13.72 3.18 2511.66 43.82 138.87 9.17 31.54 10.91 
Cote I’voire LM 1985 6.81 2.03 1264.38 45.53 24.04 0.34 46.77 1.68 
Cote I’voire LM 1986 3.1 0.63 1257.30 37.97 35.81 0.39 39.50 1.90 
Cote I’voire LM 1987 6.66 1.6 1208.04 40.51 42.92 0.43 33.43 2.38 
Cote I’voire LM 1988 10.68 2.53 1178.97 36.89 42.64 0.42 30.49 4.14 
Cote I’voire LM 1992 21.58 6.45 1040.98 39.39 49.52 0.44 31.91 6.78 
Cote I’voire L 1993 19.22 5.41 1004.13 39.35 57.56 0.52 29.44 6.91 
Cote I’voire L 1995 19.11 4.67 1016.30 40.56 151.06 1.37 41.76 11.02 
Cote I’voire L 1998 25.66 7.57 1091.51 38.96 142.57 1.13 41.40 7.67 
Cote I’voire L 2002 23.03 7.05 978.74 41.34 120.09 0.97 47.46 8.65 
Cote I’voire LM 2008 29.02 10.3 939.63 43.18 198.92 0.82 47.12 2.58 
Egypt L 1990 4.46 0.6 878.22 32 4283.5 9.93 20.05 14.04 
Egypt LM 1996 2.46 0.34 966.31 30.13 3107 4.59 20.75 3.24 
Egypt LM 2000 1.81 0.31 1103.44 32.76 2852 2.86 16.20 1.37 
Egypt LM 2004 2.26 0.43 1166.46 32.14 3340.7 4.24 28.23 1.97 
Egypt LM 2008 1.68 0.37 1392.25 30.75 8694 5.34 33.04 1.07 
Ethiopia L 1995 67.9 27.07 127.02 44.56 27.36 0.36 9.62 11.44 
Ethiopia L 1999 55.25 16.03 132.59 29.98 33.73 0.44 11.87 8.35 
Ethiopia L 2004 36.31 8.34 148.85 29.81 133.74 1.32 14.75 18.05 
Ethiopia L 2010 33.54 9.04 237.36 33.17 345.15 1.15 13.60 11.78 
Ghana L 1987 63.84 25.13 356.31 35.35 0.7 0.01 19.66 8.06 
Ghana L 1988 62.8 24.61 366.25 35.99 6 0.12 18.18 11.07 
Ghana L 1992 47.38 16.4 389.43 38.44 7.30 0.11 17.23 9.55 
Ghana L 1998 33.9 11.33 431.47 40.07 29.5 0.39 33.87 9.38 
Ghana L 2006 25.15 8.41 520.17 42.77 105.25 0.52 25.19 6.09 
Guinea L 1991 92.31 62.96 277.33 46.84 13.6 0.45 30.33 12.52 
Guinea L 1994 48.54 19.01 264.26 46.08 0.49 0.01 22.75 10.59 
Guinea L 2002 61.6 26.14 301.95 43 15.19 0.51 26.48 8.61 
Guinea L 2007 59.7 23.71 301.73 39.36 15.07 0.36 28.76 5.52 
Guinea L 2012 35.27 10.34 303.49 33.73 66.3 1.17 29.72 5.99 
Guinea-
Bissau 
L 1993 64.02 28.37 485.82 43.61 1.5 0.63 8.87 39.91 
Guinea-
Bissau 
L 2002 53.87 18.63 396.81 35.57 17.63 4.24 17.83 14.44 
Guinea-
Bissau 
L 2010 67.08 30.53 422.17 50.66 45.89 5.41 19.98 14.80 
Kenya L 1992 23.08 7.93 523.46 57.46 114.84 1.40 26.26 10.76 
Kenya L 1994 18.84 6.38 507.16 43.86 137.28 1.92 37.04 9.47 
Kenya L 1997 21.5 5.59 511.16 46.3 351.78 2.68 22.69 3.42 
Kenya L 2005 33.6 11.7 530.08 48.51 424.99 2.67 28.51 4.05 
Lesotho L 1987 74.77 44.17 443.63 56.02 353.09 95.60 13.02 28.39 
Lesotho L 1994 69.56 44.79 573.68 63.24 319.65 42.34 24.48 15.31 
Lesotho L 2003 61.31 31.99 685.95 51.57 556.89 57.46 60.07 8.14 
Lesotho LM 2010 59.65 31.83 867.66 54.18 610.13 27.89 44.38 11.71 
Madagascar L 1993 69.36 30.35 290.31 45.26 13.54 0.40 15.32 10.72 
 
Madagascar L 1997 65.85 28.12 275.78  39.47 12.18  0.34 21.87 23.49 
Madagascar L 1999 64.13 27.71 281.63  38.61 11.62  0.31 24.47 9.63 
Madagascar L 2001 68.68 34.36 294.05  47.44 10.87  0.24 29.08 8.17 
Madagascar L 2005 74.06 31.7 275.52  38.88 115.17  2.29 28.21 18.12 
Madagascar L 2010 81.76 40.32 275.00  40.63 547.03  6.27 24.97 5.38 
Mali L 1994 84.88 51.88 304.17  50.44 103.19  5.85 23.01 24.94 
Mali L 2001 57.92 22.91 384.46  39.87 88.17  3.35 33.30 13.38 
Mali L 2006 50.58 17.46 432.79  38.93 211.84  3.46 30.77 14.14 
Mali L 2010 49.25 15.19 459.65  33.04 472.75  5.02 26.00 11.55 
Mauritania L 1987 40.05 17.35 681.87  43.94 6.70  0.74 49.09 21.31 
Mauritania L 1993 41.16 13.66 663.85  50.05 2.27  0.18 32.00 27.00 
Mauritania L 1996 20.62 6.13 685.14  37.75 4.37  0.30 49.41 18.85 
Morocco  1984 10.95 2.31 1170.72  39.19 873.73  6.17 26.64 2.40 
Morocco LM 1990 2.81 0.4 1401.45  39.2 2006.35  6.96 25.69 4.30 
Morocco LM 1998 7.4 1.29 1600.02  39.46 2010.74  5.02 24.41 1.33 
Morocco LM 2001 6.18 1.28 1697.64  40.64 3260.92  8.64 29.41 1.28 
Morocco LM 2007 3.12 0.61 2092.82  40.72 6730.47  8.95 35.75 1.62 
Mozambique L 1996 85.36 47.28 196.80  44.41 61  1.88 14.79 27.32 
Mozambique L 2002 80.36 41.53 271.30  47.04 52.55  1.25 27.34 52.82 
Mozambique L 2009 68.74 31.41 357.11  45.58 111.13  1.04 29.05 18.78 
Namibia L 1994 52.87 27.77 2878.74  74.33 14.90  0.41 44.47 3.77 
Namibia L 2004 31.46 10.17 3536.23  63.32 15.24  0.23 39.81 2.62 
Namibia L 2010 22.6 6.65 4122.14  60.97 15.12  0.13 47.80 2.27 
Niger L 1993 78.19 34.12 261.42  36.1 15.87  0.99 15.64 21.07 
Niger L 1994 81.38 43.13 262.67  41.53 6.90  0.44 16.53 23.86 
Niger L 2005 74.93 35.5 252.50  44.43 66.37  1.95 16.59 15.33 
Niger L 2007 72.02 28.75 255.79  37.3 79.35  1.85 17.43 12.68 
Niger L 2011 50.34 13.91 264.53  31.45 165.93  2.59 20.90 10.13 
Nigeria L 1985 46.01 17.39 639.54  38.68 10  0.03 17.39 0.11 
Nigeria L 1992 57.06 27.37 559.82  44.98 56  0.19 37.51 0.88 
Nigeria L 1996 63.5 31.07 546.25  51.92 947  2.71 32.24 0.54 
Nigeria L 2004 53.46 21.92 797.68  40.06 2272.7  2.59 30.16 0.66 
Nigeria LM 2010 53.47 21.76 997.45  42.97 19817.84  5.37 25.26 0.56 
Rwanda L 1984 63.65 19.9 263.23  28.9 2.94  0.19 12.63 10.25 
Rwanda L 2000 76.97 37.93 224.90  48.55 6.63  0.38 6.32 18.53 
Rwanda L 2006 68 31.14 305.48 52.04 28.99 0.93 12.30 19.39 
Rwanda L 2011 60.25 23.7 393.02 51.34 174.26 2.72 14.43 19.73 
Senegal LM 1991 67.97 36.11 677.30 54.14 162.56 2.89 23.09 11.17 
Senegal L 1994 56.78 21 635.06 41.44 113.83 2.94 31.75 16.39 
Senegal L 2001 48.58 16.1 716.65 41.23 304.68 6.25 28.73 8.86 
Senegal L 2006 37.58 12.44 770.51 39.22 925.24 9.89 25.63 9.24 
Senegal LM 2011 37.98 12.79 792.11 40.28 1613.91 11.18 25.17 7.34 
Sierra Leone L 2003 58.59 21.76 315.46 40.17 25.89 1.89 14.07 24.58 
Sierra Leone L 2011 52.33 16.7 381.38 33.99 58.81 2.01 16.32 14.50 
South Africa UM 1993 31.91 11 4668.25 59.33 101.70 0.08 21.83 0.20 
South Africa UM 1995 34.94 13.84 4757.96 62.97 105.32 0.07 22.14 0.25 
South Africa LM 2001 35.2 13.28 4884.44 57.77 297.39 0.24 29.37 0.35 
South Africa UM 2006 23.13 7.23 5671.15 64.79 691.93 0.25 29.27 0.26 
South Africa UM 2009 15.07 4.16 5820.66 63.01 862.05 0.29 27.91 0.36 
South Africa UM 2011 16.56 4.9 6010.41 63.38 1158.42 0.28 30.44 0.34 
Swaziland LM 1995 81.66 51.04 2099.84 60.45 82.55 4.86 60.02 3.40 
Swaziland LM 2001 48.44 17.49 2191.33 53.11 52.88 3.92 85.44 2.16 
Swaziland LM 2009 42.03 16.64 2440.41 51.45 93.46 2.97 59.15 1.78 
Tanzania L 2000 84.74 44.54 361.66 37.3 8 0.08 13.36 10.45 
Tanzania L 2007 52.73 18.95 481.23 40.28 25.46 0.12 18.92 13.12 
Tanzania L 2012 46.6 14.35 556.06 37.78 67.38 0.17 21.29 7.30 
Togo L 2006 55.55 21.05 383.95 42.21 232.17 10.54 38.20 3.63 
Togo L 2011 54.18 23.21 395.72 46.02 244.13 6.50 39.43 14.45 
Tunisia LM 1985 13.93 3.47 1975.90 43.43 270.82 3.22 32.10 1.91 
Tunisia LM 1990 9.82 2.44 2033.42 40.24 551.04 4.48 43.65 3.19 
Tunisia LM 1995 10.86 2.54 2237.69 41.66 679.88 3.77 44.90 0.41 
Tunisia LM 2000 5.32 1.02 2758.46 40.81 795.95 3.71 39.55 1.03 
Tunisia LM 2005 3.09 0.65 3217.89 37.73 1392.67 4.32 44.93 1.12 
Tunisia UM 2010 1.99 0.4 3847.59 35.81 2063.29 4.64 50.05 1.24 
Uganda L 1999 52.13 19.19 274.43 43 232.60 3.88 12.25 10.09 
Uganda L 2002 62.21 24.47 293.98 45.17 422.58 6.84 11.21 11.74 
Uganda L 2005 53.18 19.4 321.44 42.94 321.81 3.57 14.18 13.23 
Uganda L 2009 41.46 13.16 393.62 44.2 781.10 4.60 19.81 10.50 
Uganda L 2012 33.24 10.13 429.40 42.37 910.32 3.84 19.91 6.98 
 
 
Source: Poverty and Gini coefficient data are from World Bank (2015d), and remittances, exports and ODA data are from World Bank (2015b), 






Zambia L 2003 49.44 17.45 635.32  42.06 36.30  0.74 25.68 15.80 
Zambia L 2005 56.69 27.26 691.81  54.29 52.87  0.63 30.61 14.07 
Zambia L 2006 60.46 30.1 726.11  54.62 57.68  0.45 32.59 11.50 
Appendix B: Derivation of GLS and 2SLS estimators 
Derivation of GLS estimator 
In Section 5.2.1 we estimated the poverty model using the GLS estimator to account for 
possible heteroscedasticity in the model. As discussed in Section 5.2.1 the estimated impact of 
remittances on poverty may be biased by unobservable country specific factors, which either 
cannot be measured or have not been accounted for. In other words, there could be latent 
heterogeneity present in the errors. Although this will generally not interfere with consistent 
parameter estimation, failing to account for the presence of heterogeneity will yield 
inconsistent estimates of the standard errors of the estimated parameters and can invalidate 
statistical inferences (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). In the presence of panel-level 
heteroscedasticity, GLS provides efficient estimates over OLS (Arrelano, 2003: 20). The GLS 
estimator transforms the model equation into a new model by assigning weights to the errors. 
The variances of the errors in the transformed model are equal and constant, thus removing the 
problem of heteroscedasticity.  
The GLS estimator, 
  ?̂?𝑔𝑙𝑠⁡ = (𝑋′Σ−1𝑋)−1(𝑋′Σ−1𝑌)          (B.1) 
 can be considered as an alternative to the OLS estimator, 
?̂?𝑜𝑙𝑠⁡ = (𝑋
′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑌            (B.2) 
The GLS estimation technique works as follows: suppose V is a symmetric square matrix with 
the property, 𝑉𝑉 = Σ−1. V can be considered as being the square root of Σ−1. 𝑉 has the property 
that Σ1/2⁡𝑉 = 𝑉Σ1/2 = 𝐼. Now consider the model equation, 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝐵 + 𝑒  (B.3) 
 
Multiply both sides of equation by the matrix V such that, (𝑉𝑌) = (𝑉𝑋)𝐵 + (𝑉𝑒). To simplify 
the expression the terms in parenthesis can be represented as starred variables, 𝑌∗ = 𝑉𝑌, 𝑋∗ =
𝑉𝑋 and 𝑒∗ = 𝑉𝑒.  
Therefore, the new model equation is given by, 
𝑌∗ = 𝑋∗𝐵 + 𝑒∗                                                                        (B.4) 
The errors of the transformed model are now homoscedastic and uncorrelated, 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑒∗) = 𝑒∗𝑒∗
′
= (𝑉𝑒𝑒′𝑉) = 𝑉Σ𝑉 = 𝑉Σ1/2Σ1/2𝑉 = 𝐼                                    (B.5)                                  














Derivation of 2SLS estimator 
In Section 5.2.2 we employed the 2SLS estimator to estimate the remittances and poverty 
relationship, while accounting for the possible reverse causality between remittances and 
poverty. As discussed in Section 5.2.2 reverse causality would make remittances endogenous 
to poverty. Endogenous variables are correlated with the disturbance term. This violates the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions making the OLS estimates biased. To take account of the possible 
enogeneity problem the study adopts the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation approach. 
The 2SLS technique replaces the endogenous variable with predicted values of the endogenous 
variable when regressed on a set of instruments. The simple 2SLS estimation procedure works 
as follows: 
Consider two equations where 𝑌 and 𝑋1 are endogenous: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼10 + 𝛽11𝑋1𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑋2𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑋3𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽1𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖         (B.7)    
𝑋1𝑖 = 𝛼20 + 𝛽21𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽22𝑍2𝑖 + 𝛽23𝑍3𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽2𝑘𝑍𝑘𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖  (B.8)    
Now substitute equation (B.7) into equation (B.8): 
𝑋1𝑖 = 𝛼20 + 𝛽21(𝛼10 + 𝛽11𝑋1𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑋2𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑋3𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽1𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖) + 𝛽22𝑍2𝑖 + 𝛽23𝑍3𝑖 +
⋯+ 𝛽2𝑘𝑍𝑘𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖                                                                                                                  (B.9) 
In equation (B.9) we see that 𝑋1 is a linear function of 𝑢, and therefore will be correlated with 
𝑢. This violates the Gauss-Markov assumptions, and the OLS estimator ?̂?11  will be biased. 
The objective of the 2SLS estimation technique is to find an instrument for 𝑋1 that will not be 
correlated with 𝑢. In other words, finding an instrument, 𝑍, that influences 𝑋1 but does not 
influence 𝑌.⁡ 
In the first stage of the 2SLS estimation technique, the endogenous variable, 𝑋1, is regressed 
on the set of instruments and the exogenous variables using OLS: 
𝑋1𝑖 = 𝛼30 + 𝛽31𝑍𝑖 + 𝛽32𝑋2𝑖 + 𝛽33𝑋3𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽3𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖         (B.10)  
The estimated variable allows us to generate a new set of values for the variable ?̂?1: 
?̂?1𝑖 = ?̂?30 + ?̂?31𝑍𝑖 + ?̂?32𝑋2𝑖 + ?̂?33𝑋3𝑖 +⋯+ ?̂?3𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖         (B.11)  
Thus, 
𝑋1 = ?̂?1 +⁡𝑣  (B.12) 
In the second stage of the 2SLS estimation technique,  ?̂?1 is substituted for  𝑋1 in equation 
(B.7): 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼10 + 𝛽11(?̂?1𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖) + 𝛽12𝑋2𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑋3𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽1𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                   (B.13) 
This can be rewritten as: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼10 + 𝛽11?̂?1𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑋2𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑋3𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽1𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 + (𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽11?̂?𝑖)              (B.14) 
The new equation is estimated using OLS and produces consistent estimates of all the 
parameters.  
 
Appendix C: Estimation results  
Table C-1.Results of the Likelihood ratio test for heteroscedasticity 
 LR chi2(31) Prob > chi2 
Poverty headcount 249.00 0.0000 
Poverty gap 92.52 0.0000 
Note: The null hypothesis states that the variances of the errors are homoscedastic. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
 
Table C-2.Results of First-stage regression for 2SLS estimation 
 Remittances   










Educational attainment -0.07 
(0.076) 



















Adjusted R^2  0.96 
F(8, 74) 253.58 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2015a).  
 
 
Table C-3. Results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Prob F(1,78) 
Poverty headcount 0.640308 0.4260 
Poverty gap 0.928383 0.3383 
Note: The null hypothesis states that the variables are exogenous. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
